英文早读第19篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
In the early 1950's a competitive method of under-writing known as "carding" made inroads on Sanborn's business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over 500,000 in the late 1930's to under 100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this ammounted to an almost elimination of what had beed sizable, stable earning power.
在1950年代早期，一个有竞争力的方法在承保时使用的叫“计分制”削弱了三伯恩的业务，地图业务的税后净利润从1930年代末期平均每年超过50万美金下降到了1958年和1959年不足10万美金。考虑到在这段时期上涨的经济势头，这意味着拥有的规模化的稳定的盈利能力几乎被消灭了。
However, during the early 1930's Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about 2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.
然后，在1930年代早期，三伯恩开始积累投资组合。由于业务没有资金需求，因此任何留存的利润都可能用于投资。在一段时间，大约250万美金被投资了，一半在债券，一半在股市。因此，尤其在过去这几十年，投资组合蓬勃发展而运行的地图业务萎缩了。
Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at 110 per share. In 1958 with the Average in the 550 area, Sanborn sold at 45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about 20 per share to 65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of 90 per share on the map business (110 less the 20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus 20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for noting.
让我给你这两方面大的差异上给些主意。在1938年，当道琼斯工业指数在100至120的范围，三伯恩每股110美金。在1958年，指数到了550的范围，三伯恩卖45美金每股。还有在同样的时期，三伯恩投资组合的价值从每股大约20美金增长到了65美金。这意味着，事实上，在1938年三伯恩股票的购买者给了地图业务积极的估值，每股约90美金（110减去20元和地图业务不相关的投资），那是商业和股市都令人沮丧的年份。在市场极度繁荣的1958年，同样的地图业务被估值为负的20元，投票购买者不愿意为购买1美元支付超过70美分，地图业务被认为一无是处。
How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite "carding" over 500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by "mapping" companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn's product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.
这些是怎么发生的？三伯恩在1958年和1938年同样拥有大量的信息对于保险业有巨大价值。为了复制他们这么多年收集的这些详细信息将花费成百上千万美金。尽管计分制超过5亿美金的火灾保费被发行通过类地图公司。然而，销售和包装三伯恩公司产品、信息的方法这么多年都没有改变，最终也将会反馈到盈利上。
The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about 2 million per year and owned about 7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director's and committee fees.
明显事实是这个投资组合做的如此好以至于最小化了董事对地图业务复兴的需求。三伯恩每年有200万美金左右的销售规模并拥有大约700万美金的市值。从投资组合获得的收益是巨大的，公司业务没有任何可能的财务担忧，保险公司对付给地图的费用是满意的，并且持股人仍然可以收到分红。虽然在过去八年分红被减少了5次，但我没有找到任何用于减少薪水或者董事或委员会费用的提议。
Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had only been sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.
在我进入董事会前，14名董事有9名是来自保险行业杰出人士，他们联合拥有105000流通股中的46股。尽管他们在大公司位处高层，会建议公司的财务支出来保持至少温和的合作协议，他们中最大的持股方是10股。在另一些情况下，这些人运作的保险公司拥有很少的股票，带着些投资只是象征意义的。在过去的几十年，任何包括三伯恩股票的交易，保险公司都是卖出方。
49.under-writing：发行；承销；承保
50.inroad：（尤指通过消耗或削弱其他事务取得的）进展
51.bias：偏见；偏向；偏爱；使偏向；使偏心
52.accumulate：积累；积聚；（数量）逐渐增加；（数额）逐渐增长
53.blossom：开花；变得更加健康（自信、成功）；花朵
54.wilt：凋谢；枯萎；萎缩；微缩；支撑不住；失去自信
55.divergence：分歧；差异；发散
56.depress：使沮丧；按、压、推下；使抑郁；使萧条；降低价格；减少工资
57.tremendously：极大地；非常；巨大
58.vigorous：充满活力的；精力充沛的；强壮的；强健的；果断的
59.possess：拥有；掌握；控制；支配
60.premium：保险费；额外费用；附加费；高昂的；优质的
61.inertia：惯性；惰性；保守；缺乏活力
62.serve to：服务于；用来；有助于
63.rejuvenation：复兴；更新；回春
64.pertain：适用；存在
65.wherewithal：（做某事的）所需资金；必要的设备；必要的技术
