汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）的著作《The Ethics and Economics of Private Property》（私有财产的伦理学和经济学），简单整理了中英文对照版。王文玉译，2006-9-16。

The Ethics and Economics of Private Property 私有财产的伦理学和经济学

10/15/2004 Hans-Hermann Hoppe

I. The Problem of Social Order 社会秩序问题

Alone on his island, Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases. For him, the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct—social cooperation—simply does not arise. Naturally, this question can only arise once a second person, Friday, arrives on the island. Yet even then, the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists. Suppose the island is the Garden of Eden; all external goods are available in superabundance. They are "free goods," just as the air that we breathe is normally a "free" good. Whatever Crusoe does with these goods, his actions have repercussions neither with respect to his own future supply of such goods nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for Friday (and vice versa). Hence, it is impossible that there could ever be a conflict between Crusoe and Friday concerning the use of such goods. A conflict is only possible if goods are scarce. Only then will there arise the need to formulate rules that make orderly—conflict-free—social cooperation possible.

孤岛上的鲁宾逊可以做自己想做的任何事情。对于他来说，根本不存在有秩序的人类行为—社会协作—准则问题。只有当第二个人，星期五，来到这个岛上时，这个问题才会出现。尽管如此，只要没有稀缺性，这个问题仍然无关紧要。假设该岛是个伊甸园，所有身外之物都极为丰富。它们是“自由物品”，就像我们呼吸的空气那样的“自由”物品。无论鲁宾逊用这些物品做什么，关于这种物品，它的行为既不影响他自己的未来供给，也不影响星期五的当前和未来供给。反过来也是如此。所以，关于这些物品的使用，鲁宾逊和星期五之间不可能发生冲突。只有在物品稀缺的情况下，冲突才有可能发生，才有必要建立准则，使没有冲突的有秩序社会协作成为可能。

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist: the physical body of a person and its standing room. Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and can stand only at one place at a time. Hence, even in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise: Crusoe and Friday cannot occupy the same standing room simultaneously without coming thereby into physical conflict with each other. Accordingly, even in the Garden of Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist—rules regarding the proper location and movement of human bodies. And outside the Garden of Eden, in the realm of scarcity, there must be rules that regulate not only the use of personal bodies but also of everything scarce so that all possible conflicts can be ruled out. This is the problem of social order.

在伊甸园里，只有两样东西是稀缺的：一个人的身体和他站立的地方。鲁宾逊和星期五各自只有一个身体，而且在同一时刻，一个身体只能站立在一个地方。因此，即使是在伊甸园里，鲁宾逊和星期五之间也能发生冲突：两个人无法在同一时刻占领同一空间。所以，即使是在伊甸园里，也必须建立有序的社会行为准则—正当地放置和移动身体的准则。走出伊甸园，在有稀缺性的现实世界里，更需要准则。这些准则不仅要协调个人身体的使用，而且要协调每一件稀缺物品的使用，消除可能发生的冲突。这就是社会秩序问题。

II. The Solution: Private Property and Original Appropriation 解决办法：私有财产和先占

In the history of social and political thought, various proposals have been advanced as a solution to the problem of social order, and this variety of mutually inconsistent proposals has contributed to the fact that today’s search for a single "correct" solution is frequently deemed illusory. Yet as I will try to demonstrate, a correct solution exists; hence, there is no reason to succumb to moral relativism. The solution has been known for hundreds of years, if not for much longer.¹ In modern times this old and simple solution was formulated most clearly and convincingly by Murray N. Rothbard.²

在社会和政治思想史中，人们曾经为社会秩序问题提出各种各样的解决办法。这些相互不一致的建议造成的一个事实是，今天人们通常认为，要找到惟一的“正确”解决办法纯属幻想。然而，正如我将要证明的那样，这样一个正确答案是存在的，从而没有理由向道德相对论屈服。这个解决办法是人们已经知道了几百年的答案，甚至更早。¹ 在现代，这个古老而简单的解决办法，在罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）的著作中，得到了最清楚和最令人信服的阐述。²

Let me begin by formulating the solution—first for the special case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case represented by the "real" world of all-around scarcity—and then proceed to the explanation of why this solution, and no other, is correct.

接下来，我首先以伊甸园为例，简述这个解决办法，然后将其推广到稀缺性普遍存在的“现实”世界，最后解释为什么唯有这个答案是正确的。

In the Garden of Eden, the solution is provided by the simple rule stipulating that everyone may place or move his own body wherever he pleases, provided only that no one else is already standing there and occupying the same space. And outside of the Garden of Eden, in the realm of all-around scarcity the solution is provided by this rule: Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and nature-given goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body, provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him. This ownership of "originally appropriated" places and goods by a person implies his right to use and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit, provided that he does not thereby forcibly change the physical integrity of places and goods originally appropriated by another person. In particular, once a place or good has been first appropriated, in John Locke’s words, by "mixing one’s labor" with it, ownership in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a voluntary—contractual—transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner.

在伊甸园中，提供这个解决办法的是一个简单的准则：每个人都可以把自己的身体放置和移动到他喜欢的任何地方，倘若没有人已经站在那儿和占据同一空间。走出伊甸园，来到稀缺性普遍存在的现实世界，提供这个解决办法的准则是：每个人都正当地拥有自己的身体、他占据并以他的身体为手段加以利用的地方和自然赠予的物品，倘若没有人在他之前占据或利用相同地方和物品。一个人对“最先占有”的地方和物品的所有权，意味着他有权按照他认为合适的方式利用和改造这些地方和物品，倘若他不因此而强迫改变另一个人占有的地方和物品的有形完整性。尤其是，一旦一个地方和一件物品被人占有了，用洛克的话说，通过“把自己的劳动”与之混合，这个地方和物品的所有权的获得方式就只能是其财产权从原先的所有者向后来的所有者的自愿契约转让。

In light of wide-spread moral relativism, it is worth pointing out that this idea of original appropriation and private property as a solution to the problem of social order is in complete accordance with our moral "intuition." Is it not simply absurd to claim that a person should not be the proper owner of his body and the places and goods that he originally, i.e., prior to anyone else, appropriates, uses and/or produces by means of his body? For who else, if not he, should be their owner? And is it not also obvious that the overwhelming majority of people—including children and primitives—in fact act according to these rules, and do so as a matter of course?

值得指出的是，依照广为流行的道德相对论，把最先占有和私有财产作为社会秩序问题的一个解决办法的想法完全符合我们的道德“直觉”。十分荒谬的是，一个人不应该正当地拥有他的身体、他先于他人利用的地方和物品，以及他用自己的身体生产出来的东西。如果不是他本人，谁应该是它们的所有者呢？事实上，绝大多数人，包括孩子和未开化的人，都遵从这个准则，将其当作理所当然的事情来做。

Moral intuition, as important as it is, is not proof. However, there also exists proof of the veracity of our moral intuition.

道德直觉固然重要，毕竟不是证明。然而，我们的道德直觉的真实性有一个证明。

The proof is two-fold. On the one hand, the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity of the institution of original appropriation and private property are spelled out: If person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two alternatives would exist. Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.

这个证明包括两个方面。一方面，如果一个人要否认最先占有和私有财产制度的有效性，那么，随之而来的结果是：如果A不拥有他自己的身体、他最先占有的地方和物品、用这个身体生产出来的物品以及通过自愿（契约）的方式从原来的所有者那里获得的东西，那么，只剩下两个选择：要么另一个人B拥有A的身体、A最先占有的地方和物品以及A生产或获得的东西；要么A和B是所有身体、地方和物品的等额共同所有者。

In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation. B would be the owner of A’s body and all places and goods appropriated, produced and acquired by A, but A in turn would not be the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated, produced and acquired by B. Hence, under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons would be constituted— Untermenschen such as A and Uebermenschen such as B—to whom different "laws" apply. Accordingly, such ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational animal). From the very outset, any such ruling is recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law. For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone.

在第一种情况下，A成了B的奴隶和剥削对象。B拥有A的身体以及A最先占有、生产和获得的所有地方和物品，但A不能反过来拥有B的身体以及B最先占有、生产和获得的物品。于是，在这个准则下，有截然不同的两类人，下等人A和上等人B，各自适用不同的“法律”。因此，这样的准则决不能被当作一个道德规范而适用于每个有人格的人（理性的动物）。从一开始，这样的准则就不可能被广为接受，从而无法要求代表法律。一个准则要想成为法律，一个正义的规则，它必须是一个公平和普遍地适用于每个人的准则。

Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership, the requirement of equal law for everyone would be fulfilled. However, this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency, because if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must also be rejected.) Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means (at least of the person’s body and its standing room), but if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co-owner’s consent to do so. Yet how could anyone grant such consent were he not the exclusive owner of his own body (including his vocal chords) by which means his consent must be expressed? Indeed, he would first need another’s consent in order to be allowed to express his own, but these others could not give their consent without having first his, and so it would go on.

在第二种情况下，全体和均等的共同所有制，法律面前人人平等的要求得到了满足。然而，这个选择有着更为严重的缺陷。这是因为，如果这个准则真的得到应用，人类就会立即毁灭。（由于任何人类道德规范都必须允许人类生存，这个选择必须被拒绝）。这是因为，人的行动需要使用某种稀缺手段，至少要使用自己的身体和立足之地。但是，如果所有物品都是人人共有的，那么，除非得到每个共同所有者同意，没有人能够在任何时间和地点做任何事情。然而，假如一个人甚至不拥有自己的身体（包括他的发音器官），他又如何表达自己的同意呢？事实上，要表达他自己的同意，他要首先征得他人的同意，但没有他的同意，这些人同样无法表达他们的同意。如此等等。

This insight into the praxeological impossibility of "universal communism," as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings me immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order.³ Whether or not persons have any rights and, if so, which ones, can only be decided in the course of argumentation (propositional exchange). Justification—proof, conjecture, refutation—is argumentative justification. Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative contradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument. Even an ethical relativist would have to accept this first proposition, which is referred to accordingly as the apriori of argumentation.

这意味着，在人的行动逻辑上，“普遍共产主义”是不可能的。当罗斯巴德提到这个建议时，它直接引导我用另一种方式证明最先占有和私有财产是社会秩序问题的唯一正确答案。³ 人是否有某些权利？如果有，有哪些权利？这只能在争论中解决（即交换提议）。证明合理—证明、推测和驳斥—是争论意义上的合理（argumentative justification）。谁否认这个命题，谁就会陷入表述上的矛盾（performative contradiction ），因为他的否认本身也是争论。道德相对论者（ethical relativist）甚至也不得不接受这个第一命题。这个命题被称为争论的先验性(apriori of argumentation)。

From the undeniable acceptance—the axiomatic status—of this apriori of argumentation, two equally necessary conclusions follow. First, it follows from the apriori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity. Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday that Friday were not the name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe could face conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so might he with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe already occupied. In this case, at least if the gorilla were the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there would be no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla would push aside, crush, or devour Crusoe—that would be the gorilla’s solution to the problem—or Crusoe would tame, chase, beat, or kill the gorilla—that would be Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one might indeed speak of moral relativism. However, it would be more appropriate to refer to this situation as one in which the question of justice and rationality simply would not arise; that is, it would be considered an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla would pose a technical, not a moral, problem for Crusoe. He would have no other choice than to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he would have to learn to manage and control other inanimate objects of his environment.

从不可否认即具有公理地位的争论的先验性出发，可以得出两个必然结论。第一，根据争论的先验性，我们可以说明在什么时候稀缺性导致的冲突问题没有合理的解决办法。在前面描述的鲁宾逊和星期五的情形中，假设星期五不是一个人，而是一个大猩猩。显然，关于自己的身体和站立空间，鲁宾逊会与现在的大猩猩星期五发生冲突，就像与星期五那个人有冲突那样。这个大猩猩兴许也想站在鲁宾逊正占据的地方。在这种情况下，如果这个大猩猩是我们了解的那类实体，那么，这一冲突没有合理的解决办法。要么大猩猩推开、压服或吞吃鲁宾逊，要么鲁宾逊驯服、赶跑、打败或杀死大猩猩。前者是大猩猩的解决办法，后者是鲁宾逊的解决办法。在这种情况下，我们的确可以谈论道德相对论。然而，我们也可以说，这种情况下，正当性和合理性问题根本就不存在。也就是说，这种情况是超道德的。大猩猩星期五的存在给鲁宾逊造成的只是一个技术问题，而不是一个道德问题。除了学会管理和控制大猩猩的移动之外，鲁宾逊没有别的选择，就像他必须学会管理和控制他的环境中其他无生命的东西那样。

By implication, only if both parties in a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution to it a meaningful question. Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance, is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one can be expected to give any answer to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point, who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument. In that case, this "other" cannot but be regarded and treated as an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other entity can pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step back, and say "yes" or "no" to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.

这意味着，只有冲突双方能够相互争论时，才能够谈论道德问题，是否存在一个解决办法的问题才是一个有意义的问题。不管他的有形外表如何，只有星期五能够争论（即便他曾经只有一次表明自己能够争论），那么，他就能够被认为是理性的，社会秩序问题是否有一个正确的解决办法的问题就有了意义。不能指望一个人回答一个从来不提问题的人，或者更确切地说，后者从来没有把自己的相对观点以争论的形式表达出来。在这种情况下，“另一个人”必然被看作一个动物或植物，即被当作一个超道德的实体。只有一个实体能够中止自己的行为，无论什么行为，退回原地，并对另一个的提议回答“是”或“不”，我们才应该给这个实体一个答案，相应地，我们才有可能声称我们的答案对于冲突中的双方来说都是正确的。

Moreover, it follows from the apriori of argumentation that everything that must be presupposed in the course of an argumentation as the logical and praxeological precondition of argumentation cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed as regards its validity without becoming thereby entangled in an internal (performative) contradiction.

另外，根据争论的先验性，作为逻辑学和人类行为学意义上的争论前提，争论中必须预先假定的一些命题，这些命题的有效性不能反过来成为争论对象，不然就会陷入内在（表述行为）的矛盾之中。

Now, propositional exchanges are not made up of free-floating propositions, but rather constitute a specific human activity. Argumentation between Crusoe and Friday requires that both have, and mutually recognize each other as having, exclusive control over their respective bodies (their brain, vocal chords, etc.) as well as the standing room occupied by their bodies. No one could propose anything and expect the other party to convince himself of the validity of this proposition or deny it and propose something else unless his and his opponent’s right to exclusive control over their respective bodies and standing rooms were presupposed. In fact, it is precisely this mutual recognition of the proponent’s as well as the opponent’s property in his own body and standing room which constitutes the characteristicum specificum of all propositional disputes: that while one may not agree regarding the validity of a specific proposition, one can agree nonetheless on the fact that one disagrees. Moreover, this right to property in one’s own body and its standing room must be considered apriori (or indisputably) justified by proponent and opponent alike. Anyone who claimed any proposition as valid vis-à-vis an opponent would already presuppose his and his opponent’s exclusive control over their respective body and standing room simply in order to say "I claim such and such to be true, and I challenge you to prove me wrong."

组成交换提议的是特定人类行为，而不是一些不知原因和自由飘动的提议。鲁宾逊与星期五之间的争论需要双方相互承认各自有权独自支配自己的身体（大脑和发音器官等）以及身体占据的站立空间。除非预先假设一个人和与之争论的人有权独自支配自己的身体和站立的空间，他们中没有人能够提议任何事情，更不能期望另一方使自己相信提议的有效性，或者否认这个提议并给出新的提议。事实上，争论各方相互承认对方对自己的身体和站立空间的所有权构成争论的根本特征：一个人也许不同意某个提议的有效性，但他能够同意如下事实：有一个人不同意。此外，一个人对自己的身体和站立空间的财产权必须被争论双方看作是先验地（不可争议地）正当的。当一个人在其反对者面前声称一个提议有效时，他已经预先假设他和他的反对者有权独自支配自己的身体和站立空间。这只不过是说，“我声称某个提议是正确的，提请你证明我的错误。”

Furthermore, it would be equally impossible to engage in argumentation and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments if one were not allowed to own (exclusively control) other scarce means (besides one’s body and its standing room). If one did not have such a right, then we would all immediately perish and the problem of justifying rules—as well as any other human problem—would simply not exist. Hence, by virtue of the fact of being alive property rights to other things must be presupposed as valid, too. No one who is alive can possibly argue otherwise.

此外，假如不允许一个人拥有（独自支配）其他稀缺手段（一个人的身体和站立空间之外的手段），他同样不可能参加争论，更不能指望他的提议有影响力。如果人不拥有这样的权利，那么，我们都会马上毁灭，也就不会有正义准则问题和其他人类问题。由于人要活着，对其他东西的所有权也必定是预先假定的。一个活着的人不可能以其他方式进行争论。

If a person were not permitted to acquire property in these goods and spaces by means of an act of original appropriation, i.e., by establishing an objective (intersubjectively ascertainable) link between himself and a particular good and/or space prior to anyone else, and if instead property in such goods or spaces were granted to late-comers, then no one would ever be permitted to begin using any good unless he had previously secured such a late-comer’s consent. Yet how can a late-comer consent to the actions of an early-comer? Moreover, every late-comer would in turn need the consent of other and later later-comers, and so on. That is, neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny would have been or would be able to survive if one followed this rule. However, in order for any person—past, present or future—to argue anything, survival must be possible; and in order to do just this property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and unspecific with respect to the number of persons concerned. Rather, property rights must necessarily be conceived of as originating by means of action at definite points in time and space by definite individuals. Otherwise, it would be impossible for anyone to ever say anything at a definite point in time and space and for someone else to be able to reply. Simply saying, then, that the first-user-first-owner rule of the ethics of private property can be ignored or is unjustified implies a performative contradiction, as one’s being able to say so must presuppose one’s existence as an independent decision-making unit at a given point in time and space.⁴

还有，如果不允许一个人通过最先占有行为，即先于他人建立自己与特定物品或空间之间的关系，一个客观的（不同主体可确定的）联系，从而获得对这些物品和空间的财产权；如果对这些物品或空间的财产权要得到后来者的承认，那么，除非先前征得后来者的同意，没有人能够开始使用任何物品。然而，后来者又如何同意先来者的行动呢？此外，每个后来者需要依次征得其他人和后来者的同意，如此等等。也就是说，假如按照这个准则，我们、我们的祖先和我们的后裔都无法生存。然而，为了使过去的人、现在的人和将来的人争论某个事情，生存必须是可能的。再者，为了做到正义，财产权不能被想象为永恒的，不具体到一定个数的当事人。财产权必须被想象为源于特定个人在特定时间和地点的行为。不然，就不可能有某个人在特定时间和地点提出某项提议，另一个人能够做出回答。简单说，最先使用最先拥有的私有财产权的这一伦理准则是正当的和不可反驳的，否则意味着表述行为的矛盾。一个人要进行反驳，他必须预先假设他本人是特定时间和地点的一个独立决策者。⁴

III. Misconceptions and Clarifications 误解和澄清

According to this understanding of private property, property ownership means the exclusive control of a particular person over specific physical objects and spaces. Conversely, property rights invasion means the uninvited physical damage or diminution of things and territories owned by other persons. In contrast, a widely held view holds that the damage or diminution of the value (or price) of someone's property also constitutes a punishable offense.

如此理解私有财产，财产所有权意味着一个具体的人对特定有形物和空间的独自支配。侵犯财产权则意味着他人拥有的物品和领土的未经请求的有形损坏或减少。一种流行的观点认为，某个人的财产的价值（或价格）的破坏或减少也构成可罚的侵犯。

As far as the (in)compatibility of both positions is concerned, it is easy to recognize that nearly every action of an individual can alter the value (price) of someone else's property. For example, when person A enters the labor or the marriage market, this may change the value of B in these markets. And when A changes his relative valuations of beer and bread, or if A himself decides to become a brewer or baker, this changes the value of the property of other brewers and bakers. According to the view that value damage constitutes a rights violation, A would be committing a punishable offense vis-à-vis brewers or bakers. If A is guilty, then B and the brewers and bakers must have the right to defend themselves against A's actions, and their defensive actions can only consist of physical invasions of A and his property. B must be permitted to physically prohibit A from entering the labor or marriage market; the brewers and bakers must be permitted to physically prevent A from spending his money as he sees fit. However, in this case the physical damage or diminution of the property of others cannot be viewed as a punishable offense. Since physical invasion and diminution are defensive actions, they are legitimate. Conversely, if physical damage and diminution constitute a rights violation, then B or the brewers and bakers do not have the right to defend themselves against A's actions, for his actions—his entering of the labor and marriage market, his altered evaluation of beer and bread, or his opening of a brewery or bakery—do not affect B's bodily integrity or the physical integrity of the property of brewers or bakers. If they physically defend themselves nonetheless, then the right to defense would lie with A. In that case, however, it can not be regarded as a punishable offense if one alters the value of other people's property. A third possibility does not exist.

当我们关心两种立场的相容性时，不难理解，一个人的每个行动几乎都能改变另一个人的财产的价值（价格）。例如，当A进入劳动或婚姻市场时，会改变B在这些市场中的价值。当A改变他关于啤酒和面包的相对价值判断时时，或者A决定生产啤酒或面包时，这将改变其他啤酒制造者和面包师的财产的价值。依照价值破坏构成侵权的观点，A就是在对啤酒制造者或面包师实行可罚侵犯。如果A有罪，那么，B、啤酒制造者和面包师必定有权保护自己免受A的行为的伤害，而且他们的自卫行为只能构成对A及其财产的有形入侵。因此，必须允许B有形地禁止A进入劳动市场或婚姻市场；必须允许啤酒制造者和面包师有形地阻止A按照自己喜欢的方式花钱。然而，在这种情况下，他人财产的有形损坏或减少不能被视为可罚侵犯，因为这些有形侵犯和减少是自卫行为，是合法的。相反，如果有形损坏和减少构成侵权，那么，B或啤酒制造者和面包师就没有权利保护自己免受A的行为伤害，因为A的行为—进入劳动和婚姻市场，他改变关于啤酒和面包的评价，或者他开设一个啤酒厂或面包店—并不影响B的人身的完整性，也不影响啤酒制造者和面包师的财产的物质或有形完整性。如果他们有形地自卫，那么，自卫权就会属于A。然而，在这种情况下，一个人改变他人财产的价值就不能被视为可罚侵犯。没有第三种可能。

Both ideas of property rights are not only incompatible, however. The alternative view—that one could be the owner of the value or price of scarce goods—is indefensible. While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property, he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value(or price) of another’s property. This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations. Consequently, it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one's planned actions were legitimate. The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one's actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property, and one could not begin to act until a universal consensus had been reached. Mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled.

这两个财产权概念不但不相容，而且一个人能够是稀缺物品的价值或价格的所有者的观点也是站不住脚的。一个人能够控制自己的行为是否会有形地改变另一个人的财产，却无法控制自己的行为是否影响另一个人的财产的价值（或价格）。财产的价值是由其他个人及其评价决定的，从而不可能事先知道一个人计划的行为是否合法。所有的人都要接受审问，以保证自己的行为不会损害他人财产的价值。况且，在征得所有人同意之前，任何人都不能开始行动。在这一假设得到满足之前，人类早已灭亡。

Moreover, the assertion that one has a property right in the value of things involves a contradiction, for in order to claim this proposition to be valid—universally agreeable—it would have to be assumed that it is permissible to act before agreement is reached. Otherwise, it would be impossible to ever propose anything. However, if one is permitted to assert a proposition—and no one could deny this without running into contradictions—then this is only possible because physical property borders exist, i.e., borders which everyone can recognize and ascertain independently and in complete ignorance of others' subjective valuations.⁵

此外，一个人对物品的价值有财产权的说法是矛盾的。这是因为，要宣称这个提议有效，得到广泛接受，它必须假设在达成共识之前允许采取行动。不然，就不可能提出任何提议。然而，如果允许一个人断言某个提议—且没有人能够否认这一点而又不陷入矛盾，那么，这只是因为存在着有形的财产边界而成为可能。这个边界是每个人都能够辨认的，并能够独立地和完全不受他人主观评价影响地加以确定。⁵

Another, equally common misunderstanding of the idea of private property concerns the classification of actions as permissible or impermissible based exclusively on their physical effects, i.e., without taking into account that every property right has a history (temporal genesis).

对私有财产概念的另一个普遍误解涉及把行为分为允许的行为和不允许的行为，而这一分类的惟一基础是行为的有形后果，即没有考虑到每项财产权都有一个历史（时间起源）。

If A currently physically damages the property of B (for example by air pollution or noise), the situation must be judged differently depending on whose property right was established earlier. If A's property was founded first, and if he had performed the questionable activities before the neighboring property of B was founded, then A may continue with his activities. A has established an easement. From the outset, B had acquired dirty or loud property, and if B wants to have his property clean and quiet he must pay A for this advantage. Conversely, if B's property was founded first, then A must stop his activities; and if he does not want to do this, he must pay B for this advantage. Any other ruling is impossible and indefensible because as long as a person is alive and awake, he cannot not act. An early-comer cannot, even if he wished otherwise, wait for a late-comer and his agreement before he begins acting. He must be permitted to act immediately. And if no other property besides one's own exists (because a late-comer has not yet arrived), then one's range of action can be deemed limited only by laws of nature. A late-comer can only challenge the legitimacy of an early-comer if he is the owner of the goods affected by the early-comer's actions. However, this implies that one can be the owner of un-appropriated things; i.e., that one can be the owner of things one has not yet discovered or appropriated through physical action. This means that no one is permitted [to] become the first user of a previously undiscovered and unappropriated physical entity.

如果A有形地损坏B的财产（如空气污染或噪音），视谁的财产权较早建立，判决会有所不同。如果A的财产先建立，而且他在邻居B的财产权建立之前有可疑的行为，那么，A可以继续他的行为。这是因为，A已经建立起地役权，一开始，B获得的就是肮脏的和有噪音的财产。如果B要想使其财产变得清洁或清静，他必须为此支付B。相反，如果B的财产权在先，那么，A必须停止其行为。如果A不想停止，他必须为此支付B。其他判决都是不可能的和站不住脚的，因为只要一个人活着和醒着，他就不可能不行动，一个先来者不可能等待后来者，在得到他的同意之后才开始行动，即使他想这么做。必须允许他立即行动。而且，如果除了自己的财产之外没有别的财产（因为后来者还没有来到），那么，可以认为，一个人的行为范围仅仅受自然规律的限制。一个后来者拥有的物品受到了先来者行为的影响，他只能向先来者的合法性提出挑战。然而，这意味着，一个人能够是未被占有的物品的所有者，即一个人能够是他不曾发现或通过有形的行为而占有的物品的所有者。这意味着，不允许任何人成为先前未被发现或未被占有的有形物的第一个利用者。